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Abstract: This article explores the influence of information
overload on online democratic processes. The study of this
question is motivated by the increasing importance of the
doctrine of transparency, by the central role of the paradigm
of informed citizenship in contemporary political thought,
and by the empirical observation that the modern citizen is
exposed to increasing amounts of political data. To explore
this question, the article develops a rigorous understanding
of the concept of information overload in the democratic
context. The article argues, drawing on empirical studies
which highlight the adverse psychological impacts of
cognitive overload, that this question can undermine the
capacity of the Internet to reinvigorate democratic praxis. It
considers two different responses to this threat. The first
questions the seriousness of this threat by re-conceptualizing
democracy as a "low-information" practice. This "shallow"
understanding of democracy emphasizes the role of
heuristics and political intermediaries in modern democratic
life. While acknowledging the important role of heuristics
and political intermediaries, the article questions the
capacity of this narrative to provide a coherent account of
legitimate democratic governance. The article proceeds to
consider an alternative, technological-oriented response to
the problem of information overload. This approach
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highlights the capacity of new technological innovations to
resolve the information overload question by reducing the
cognitive burden associated with web-based political action.
The article uses a concrete case study-the advanced online
participatory framework offered by TransLink, the South
Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority-to
highlight how the information overload problem is
manifested in an actual political context. The article
concludes by exploring the blind-spots of these different
technological innovations. It considers in this context the
role of a new class of political players-techno-poitical
intermediaries-and discusses their potential influence on
the democratic process. This discussion points to certain
deficiencies in the current doctrine of transparency (and the
paradigm of the "informed citizen" underlying it), which is
insensitive both to the cognitive limitations of the average
citizen and to the increasingly important (but hidden) role of
techno-political intermediaries in the political process as it
draws increasingly on online tools.
2009]
I. INTRODUCTION
The legitimacy of political decisions depends on the quality of the
information on which they are based. We expect people to base their
political actions-from voting to engaging in public consultation-on a
deep understanding of the relevant information. We want their
decisions to be informed rather than arbitrary, capricious, or
involuntary. This expectation applies to political action at various
levels: voting in general elections, referendum over national issues,
and local consultation processes focusing on planning or
environmental dilemmas. The idea that the legitimacy of the political
decision may be undermined if it is not based on informed collective
reasoning seems to reflect deep-seated societal intuitions. It is, thus,
not enough for the democratic process to be inclusive, equal and non-
coercive. It also needs to satisfy certain cognitive requirements.
These widely shared intuitions regarding the nature of the democratic
process and the legitimacy of political decisions have deep roots in
political thought-notably the writings of Jirgen Habermas-and in
constitutional jurisprudence.
In studying the cognitive burden associated with civic political
action, I want to highlight two important facets of contemporary
political life. The first is the increasing importance of transparency in
the common understanding of legitimate governance. The doctrine of
transparency has also become one of the more influential principles of
modern administrative law, greatly increasing the amount of
information available for democratic reflection.' This doctrinal
development is a reflection, I will argue, of a strong social belief in the
value of informed citizenship. The penetration of the Internet into the
political domain constitutes the second facet. The Internet provides
unlimited opportunities for presenting, storing, and accessing political
and other information. These two processes have amplified the
cognitive demands on democratic engagement. The increasing
importance of the doctrine of transparency and the technical
opportunities made available by the Internet have increased the
amount of data citizens can and are expected to use as they enter into
the political arena. But this upsurge in information resources only
seems to have deepened the gap between the actual democratic
practices and our normative expectations. It is becoming increasingly
I The principle of transparency is also considered one of the key components of the
emerging field of global administrative law.
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difficult to cope with the cognitive challenges associated with civic
political activity. This gap poses a deep challenge to the legitimacy of
contemporary democratic institutions.
At the individual level, as we reach the boundaries of our cognitive
and attentive capacities, this cognitive challenge is experienced as
information overload. This article examines the collective
repercussions of this phenomenon- its impact on the democratic
process. This article focuses, then, on the implications of information
overload on online democratic processes (and the conception of
democracy in general).
To explore this question, the first section develops a more rigorous
understanding of the concept of information overload in the
democratic context. This conceptual exploration is necessary because
the theoretical treatment of this notion has tended to focus either on
the perspective of the individual2 or the perspective of the business
organization.3 The second and third sections consider two different
reactions to the problem of information overload. The second section
explores an alternative, shallower understanding of democracy, which
emphasizes the role of heuristics and political intermediaries. While
acknowledging the important role of political intermediaries in
modern political life, this section highlights the deep problem of a re-
conceptualization of democracy as completely mediated practice.
Section three proceeds to consider possible technological reactions to
the problem of information overload. It discusses four different
strands of technological innovations-sophisticated search
technologies, user-sensitive design, new visualization techniques, and
deliberation support technologies-which can reduce the cognitive
burden associated with political action.
The fourth section considers a concrete case study- the advanced
online participatory framework offered by TransLink, the South Coast
British Columbia Transportation Authority. This concrete case
2 Kenneth E. Himma, The Concept of Information Overload: A Preliminary Step in
Understanding the Nature of a Harmful Information-Related Condition, 9 ETHics & INFO.
TECH. 259, 267 (2007); David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The
Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277, 281-87 (1986).
3 See Ingrid Mulder et al., An Information Overload Study: Using Design Methods for
Understanding, 2o6 ACM INT'L CONF. PROC. SERIES 245, 245-52; Ruud Janssen & Henk
de Poot, Information Overload: Why Some People Seem to Suffer More than Others, 189
ACM INT'L CONF. PROC. SERIES 397,397-400; Nathan Zeldes et al., Infomania: Why We
Can't Afford to Ignore it any Longer, 12 FIRST MONDAY (Aug. 2007),
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issuel2_8/zeldes/index.html.
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highlights how the information overload problem is manifested in an
actual political context. The last section revisits the technological
reaction to the information overload problem and explores the blind-
spots of the different technological tools- the "hidden" price they may
impose on the democratic process. It explores in this context, the role
of a new class of political players-techno-political intermediaries-
and discusses their potential influence on the democratic process.
This discussion points to certain deficiencies in the current doctrine of
transparency, which is insensitive both to the cognitive limitations of
the average citizen and to the increasingly important, but still hidden,
role of techno-political intermediaries in the political process as it
draws increasingly on online tools.
II. INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE
A. THE INFORMATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC
ENGAGEMENT
Thinking about information overload in the democratic context
requires, first, that we define the kind of information that is relevant
to political action (from voting to public deliberation, regulatory
consultation, demonstration, and more). This requires a two-level
inquiry, which simultaneously explores the individual and collective
levels. In thinking about the informational requirements of political
reasoning and political deliberation, a distinction has to be made
between two different perspectives: normative and socio-
psychological. The normative perspective reflects our expectations
regarding "good" citizenship and "good" deliberative process. It refers
both to the mode of reasoning expected from a citizen who takes part
in a political interaction, and to the dialectical properties of a proper
deliberative process. Further, these primary expectations also entail
certain secondary expectations regarding the institutional
infrastructure that must be in place in order to facilitate these
"proper" forms of democratic practice. These normative intuitions
draw on three main sources: political traditions, political philosophy,
and constitutional law. In contrast, the socio-psychological
perspective explores the modes of reasoning and deliberation that
characterize, in effect, the political dynamic of contemporary
democracies.
Analyzing the influence of information overload on the democratic
process, in its individual and collective facets, requires us therefore to
develop a concept of democracy and "good citizenship," and further to
test this normative conceptualization against sociological and
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psychological evidence. Democracy is the art of living together. It
designates those multiple institutions and procedures through which a
political community can sustain itself- despite the various issues that
divide it. As Bruno Latour has put it: "We don't assemble because we
agree, look alike, feel good, are socially compatible, wish to fuse
together, but because we are brought by divisive matters of concern
into some neutral, isolated place in order to come to some sort of
provisional makeshift (dis)agreement."4 The range of issues that can
divide a political community-but that nonetheless require a
collective, binding decision-is almost endless. The unbounded
nature of political struggle imposes a difficult challenge on the
democratic enterprise. To fulfill its mission of enabling a particular
demos to continuously co-exist despite the various issues that divide
it, democracy has to develop institutional mechanisms that will enable
a community to resolve disputes involving competing logics and
cultural viewpoints.
Democracy requires, therefore, the development of collective and
individual sensitivity to multiple types of argumentation and
reasoning; or to put it in other words, it demands the development of
individual and collective sensitivities to multiple categories of
information. In order to get a better sense of the nature of this
sensitivity and of the meaning of information in the political domain, I
will draw on the analytical distinctions developed by Jirgen
Habermas in his theory of communicative action. Habermas's
analysis of democratic deliberation is based on a distinction between
different types of validity claims that can be the subject of a critical
dialogue in a public process of argumentation. These claims include
claims to empirical truth, moral rightness, ethical goodness or
authenticity, aesthetic value, and personal sincerity. 5 Political
dilemmas-from parliamentary debates about primary legislation to
local disputes about construction projects-may involve a
combination of validity claims. 6 Indeed, all of the various types of
4 Bruno Latour, From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik - or How to Make Things Public, in
MAKING THINGS PUBLIC - ATMOSPHERES OF DEMOCRACY 14, 23 (B. Latour & P. Weibel, eds.,
2005).
5 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, REASON AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY, VOL. 1, 8-23 (Thomas McCarthy, trans., 1984); Thomas
Risse, "Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 1, 9-11
(2000).
6 JiRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY io8 (William Rehg trans., 1998).
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validity claims may play a part in the deliberative process that
precedes a particular political decision. This means that the
informational spectrum associated with democratic deliberation is not
limited to propositional content classically defined (i.e., content
capable of being either true or false, what Habermas defines as
empirical claims), 7 but may involve additional categories of
information.
Let us consider more closely what is meant by these different
categories of information. Consider, first, claims to empirical truth.
These are claims about the objective world. Such claims appear
commonly in almost any political debate. Debates about the proper
policy response to environmental and health risks (e.g., the regulation
of genetically modified organisms) provide a classic example. Next,
claims to moral rightness involve moral dilemmas. They question the
rightness of different courses of action in light of their impact on
human life- and according to some moral theories, on non-human life
as well. Moral claims appear in various contexts in the political
domain. Two examples are the abortion debate in the United States8
and the environmental campaign against commercial whaling.9 Moral
and empirical claims are susceptible to universal justification in an
open and inclusive deliberative process. In the case of moral truth
claims, this presupposition rests on the idea that valid moral rules
hold for all persons; in the case of empirical truth claims, this
presupposition rests on the idea that we all live in the same objective
world.o
But political debates may involve more than empirical and moral
arguments. They can also involve ethical, aesthetic, and sincerity
claims. Ethical claims focus on questions of the good life. They can
be raised either from the perspective of a given individual ("ethical-
existential" discourse) or a particular collective ("ethical-political"
7 For this interpretation of "information," see Himma, supra note 2, at 261-62.
8 See generally FAYE D. GINSBERG, CONTESTED LIVES: THE ABORTION DEBATE IN AN
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1998).
9 See Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, http://www.stopbloodywhaling.org (last
visited Feb. 4, 2009); Whales Need Us Coalition, http://www.whalesneedus.org/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2009); Campaign Whale, http://www.campaign-whale.org, (last visited Feb.
4, 2009).
10 James Bohman & William Rehg, Jirgen Habermas, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2oo8), section 3.2, available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2oo8/entries/habermas.
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discourse). These claims may appear in both senses in political
debates.11 Claims about aesthetic value involve judgment pertaining
to the beauty and splendor of works of art and natural objects. In the
political domain, aesthetic claims could appear in debates about
conservation of natural habitats or urban environments .12
Finally, sincerity claims are claims concerning the internal
subjectivity of the agent: feelings, moods, desires, beliefs, and the like.
Such claims may become politically relevant in some contexts. For
example, in Israel, the question whether the music of Richard Wagner
should be played by government-funded Israeli Orchestras or
broadcast on Israeli national radio was debated prominently through
the lens of the negative impact such actions may have on the feelings
of Holocaust survivors.13 While feelings, as such, are not open to
rational assessment, their political implications may be.
In the political sphere, these different types of discourse may
intertwine in various and intricate ways.14 Consider, for example, the
political debate that preceded the construction of a new massive
bridge in the entrance to Jerusalem.15 Does this project represent the
best way to spend the city's limited resources, in terms of distributive
justice? Does the new bridge, which has become the most dominant
shape on Jerusalem's skyline, fit the city's unique identity, as
perceived by its citizenry? The construction of the bridge also
11 Thus, for example, the debate about governmental subsidy of cultural institutions (e.g.,
museums, opera houses) or about the proper amount of leisure time people should have
involve ethical claims of both types. See Martin Shubik, Culture and Commerce, 23 J.
CULTURAL ECON. 13 (1999); Ann Bowling & Joy Windsor, Towards the Good Life: A
Population Survey of Dimensions of Quality of Life, 2 J. HAPPINESS STUD. (No. 2).55
(2001).
12 Emily Brady, Aesthetics in Practice: Valuing the Natural World, 15 ENVTL. VALUES 277
(2OO6); Henry J. van der Windt et al., Nature and Landscape Planning: Exploring the
Dynamics of Valuation, the Case of the Netherlands, 79 LANDSCAPE AND UR. PLANNING
218 (2007).
13 Richard Wagner was associated with Nazi ideology. See Na'ama Sheffi, Cultural
Manipulation: Richard Wagner and Richard Strauss in Israel in the 195os, 34 J.
CONTEMP. HIsT. 619 (1999); see also Lilli Eylon, The Controversy Over Richard Wagner,
JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-
semitism/Wagner.html.
'4 Bohman and Rehg, supra note 10, at section 3.2.
1s Jerusalem's Bridge of Chords - A New Addition to City ofAncient Symbols, HAARETZ,
June 30, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/99621.html. The bridge was
designed by the famous Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava. Id.
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involved various empirical and aesthetic questions (Was it really
necessary in view of Jerusalem's future transportation needs? Is it
beautiful?).
The decision to go ahead with this project required the
simultaneous resolution of all these categorically different questions.
The multi-dimensional nature of political dilemmas comes into play in
other contexts as well. Thus, for example, choosing a candidate or
party in general elections requires the voter to consider the policies of
that candidate or party across multiple discursive dimensions. One of
the key features of political reasoning and political deliberation lies,
therefore, in the fact that the ultimate outcome-the decision-can be
evaluated across multiple dimensions.
Habermas's conception of democratic legitimacy presupposes the
possibility of rational political will-formation across all these different
validity horizons, at least in their political aspects. That is, Habermas
argues that there are different types of discursive tests and reasoning
that could be employed in public deliberation to resolve disputes
involving each of these distinct validity claims.16 This theoretical
claim underlies his democratic principle of legitimacy, which states:
"[O]nly those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the
assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn
has been legally constituted."17 Participating in a democratic dialogue
thus requires a willingness to engage in an argumentative process that
is open to different types of validity claims (with their idiosyncratic
forms of critique and justification). The realization of this civic duty
depends on the existence of a public sphere that is open to multiple
forms of argumentation.
Habermas's argument is far-reaching in that it assumes the
existence of "right" answers to complex political questions. It is
possible, he argues, to reach consensual decisions through collective,
rational deliberation in each of the various discursive domains
16 Habermas, supra note 6, at 108, 110; Jirgen Habermas, On the Pragmatic, the Ethical,
and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason, in JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION:
REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS 1-17 (C. Cronin trans., 1993). It should be noted that
Habermas distinguishes in this context between moral and empirical claims and ethical
and aesthetic claims. Ethical and aesthetic claims, unlike moral and empirical claims, do
not come with such a strong consensual expectation. Resolving ethical dilemmas, for
example, involves reference to individual and group-related particularities (life histories,
traditions, and particular values) and thus their resolution is more likely to be local, rather
than universal. See Bohman & Rehg, supra note lO, at section 3.2.
7 Habermas, supra note 6, at 110.
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delineated by his discourse theory.18 However, even if one rejects
Habermas's claims regarding the possibility of reaching collective
consensus,19 his characterization of the type of information that is
relevant to political decision-making seems to offer a sound basis for
thinking about democracy. Even if we do not believe that political
conflicts, in all their intricate dimensions, can be rationally resolved, it
seems that we would still like to have in place an institutional
infrastructure that will ensure: (1) that each of the different validity
claims could be freely invoked in the political domain; and (2) each of
the distinct claims will have a fair chance of being taken up in the
deliberative process-that is, they will not be disregarded. A political
sphere, in which some of these types of claims and their associated
modes of reasoning are disregarded is seen, from this perspective, as
somewhat deficient. This argument points to a different concept of
democratic legitimacy, in which the legitimacy of a political
arrangement rests not on its capacity to produce consensual decisions,
real or hypothetical, but on its capacity to facilitate a communicatively
complex deliberative process. Thus, one of the key features of a
legitimate democratic regime lies upon its capacity to create a
discursive environment that is rich in terms of the categories of
arguments and reasons it includes and supports.
Democratic legitimacy depends, then, on the creation of a
multifaceted informational sensitivity at both the individual and
institutional levels. It is not only that our democratic institutions
must provide the appropriate conditions for different types of validity
claims to be put forward; it is also our duty, as citizens, to listen and
evaluate each of these claims before we take a political action, whether
voting or deliberative contribution. Habermas's analytic distinctions
thus provide a powerful framework for studying the concept of
information overload in the political context, even if we do not accept
his view regarding the possibility of rational collective will-formation
across all or some of the different discursive dimensions he identifies.
is Bohman & Rehg, supra note lo, at section 3.4.
19 Gunther Teubner, De Collisione Discursuum: Communicative Rationalities and the
Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 901 (1996); Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal
Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, lo IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25, 52-53 (2003). This critique points, among other things, to the
lack of a meta-discourse which can guide us in the resolution of political dilemmas
involving multiple discursive domains. For further discussion, see Bohman and Rehg,
supra note 1o, at section 3.2. Grether et al. discuss a similar problem, which arises in the
context of choosing between distinct products, when the choice involves multiple
attributes. Grether et al., supra note 2, at 281-82.
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Under the foregoing account of democratic legitimacy, more
information, broadly defined, is necessarily "good," either because it
should lead to better individual contributions and superior collective
decisions,20 or because it can generate a more complex and diverse
political discussion. 21 Thus, to return to my previous example
concerning the construction of a new bridge at the entrance to
Jerusalem, this account presumes that providing more information
about the various aspects of this project, across all its various
discursive dimensions-empirical, moral, ethical, aesthetic, sincerity-
will have a positive impact on the ultimate decision and the public
deliberation preceding it.
This expansive understanding of the informational requirements
of democratic life is consistent with the rise of transparency as a key
principle of modern administrative law. The obligation of the
government to provide its citizenry with increasing amounts of
information has been given a semi-constitutional status in many
countries. It is enshrined both in specific laws and in the practice of
administrative agencies.22 A good illustration of this principle in the
environmental field has been the establishment of environmental
disclosure schemes such as the United States Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI) program and the European Pollution Emissions Register
(EPER). These schemes require manufacturers that meet certain
conditions, usually in terms of size and type of business, to provide
estimates of their chemical emissions for a designated set of toxic
20 Habermas, supra note 6, at 1o8.
21 Perez, supra note 19.
22 See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy, Doctrine of Principles, JEAN MONNET WORIUNG PAPER,
(Sept. 2003) 29-30, available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/o3/o3o9o-ol.pdf; David C. Vladeck,
Information Access-Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know
Laws, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1787 (2OO8); Cary Coglianese et al., Unifying Rulemaking
Information: Recommendations for the New Federal Docket Management System, 57
ADMIN. L. REV. 621 (2005). For three websites that illustrate the increasing import of
"transparency" in the contemporary public sphere, see Office of the Public Inspector,
http://www.opsi.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 4, 2009); Transparency International,
http://www.transparency.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2009); AccountAbility,
http://www.accountability21.net (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). It should be noted, however,
that significant amounts of data are still kept outside the public gaze, particularly data
pertaining to national security or representing trade secrets. This phenomenon of
cognitive suppression is highly problematic from a political perspective. See Peter Galison,
Removing Knowledge, 31 CRITICAL INQUIRY 229 (2004).
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substances. 23 Transparency has also emerged as an important
principle in international law.24 It is codified in various international
legal instruments25 and reflected in the unwritten practices of various
global institutions.26
B. Is THERE A DEMOCRATIC PROBLEM OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD?
Is the abundance of information generated by the modern
administrative state good for democracy? I will argue that it is not- at
least not necessarily so. The reason why information overload is a
problem, I will argue, is the deep cognitive and psychological
limitations of the human agent. We are, to use Bruno Latour's
illuminating phrase, "politically-challenged," or handicapped.27 This
conclusion also raises questions about the conceptual structure of
democratic legitimacy developed by Habermas, which takes for
granted, through its exacting informational requirements, certain
cognitive capacities of the human agent. But it is also problematic for
non-Habermasian, pluralistic accounts, which claim-or more
accurately, hope-that providing more information will necessarily
lead to a richer political discursive environment.
23 See J. Brehm & J.T. Hamilton, Noncompliance in Environmental Reporting: Are
Violators Ignorant, or Evasive, of the Law? 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 444,445 (1996). More
details about these programs can be found at http://www.epa.gov/tri and
http://eper.eea.eu.int/eper. A significant advance in the adoption of pollution registers
came in May 2003, when a broad coalition of countries signed the Protocol on Pollutant
Release and Transfer Registers (PRTR) under the Aarhus Convention. The PRTR Protocol
reflects an ambitious effort to expand mandatory disclosure requirements for toxic
pollutants. See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/prtr.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
24 Bendic Kingsbury, Nico Kirsch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 37-38 (2005).
25 See, e.g., The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted on June 25,
1998 ("Aarhus Convention"), and the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tprie/tpr~e.htm.
26 Consider, for example, the wide-ranging data that is made available to the public
through the websites of the WTO and the Global Reporting Initiative, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/docse.htm and
http://www.globalreporting.org/Home.
27 Latour, supra note 4, at 31.
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To complete my argument I need to make two points.28 First, I
need to show that the amount of political (and non-political)
information we are exposed to in today's world is in some respects
excessive. Second, I need to show that this condition adversely affects
the vitality of our democratic institutions. That is, that it makes the
products of our governing bodies less legitimate, given the normative
framework that was developed above. Consider, first, the question of
excessiveness. In what sense is the amount of information generated
by and associated with the multiple political processes that come with
modern democracy excessive? It is excessive, I will argue, if the
amount of politically-relevant information people are exposed to,
through the various communication media, together with the non-
political information, exceeds the cognitive and attentive capacities of
the average citizen. The upsurge in the amount of politically relevant
information could increase the cognitive pressure citizens are facing in
two ways. First, it can increase the effort needed to acquire
information about political choices. Second, it can increase the effort
associated with the procession of political information.29
In a web-based environment, the overload problem can manifest
itself not just in the sense of having more data than we can handle in
terms of search and processing costs, but also in the form that the data
is presented. The number of links associated with a web-page (the
"branching" factor) as well as the length of the web-page (the
"scrolling down" factor) influences its cognitive complexity. While
some structure may help users, a web-page with many layers can be
highly complex and difficult to navigate.30 Users working in a web
environment that is characterized by multiple hypertext links and
manifold layers may experience disorientation and cognitive strain- a
situation that communication scholars have labeled "the lost in
hyperspace syndrome."31
281 follow here the conceptual structure laid out in Himma, supra note 2 and David Levy,
Information Overload, in THE HANDBOOK OF INFORMATION AND COMPUTER ETHICS (KE.
Himma & H. Tavani eds., 2008).
29 See Grether, supra note 2, at 287.
30 The optimal design of web-pages in terms of user convenience may differ between
contexts and tasks and may also be a function of user characteristics. Y. A. Hamburger,
Internet and Personality, 18 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1-10 (2002); Ben
Shneiderman, Designing Information-Abundant Websites: Issues and Recommendations,
47 INT'L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 5, 5-29 (1997).
3' Olga Troyer et al., WSDM: Web Semantics Design Method, in WEB ENGINEERING:
MODELLING AND IMPLEMENTING WEB APPLICATIONS 303, 303-51 (Rossi, Pastor, Schwabe,
& Olsina, eds., 2008); J. Conklin, Hypertext: An Introduction and Survey, 20 COMPUTER
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There are numerous studies that demonstrate that the capacity of
the human mind to deal with extensive amounts of information-in
terms of attention resources, memory, and processing
(computation)-is highly limited. 32 Thus, for example, in the
consumer context, numerous studies have demonstrated that having
access to more information, in combination with using a less accurate
decision strategy as the information load increases, can lead to
inferior decisions (in terms of the consumer's preferences profile).33
The exposure to more data (content) than our attentive resources can
deal with can lead not only to inferior decisions, but it can also
adversely affect our well-being by causing diverse psychological
conditions associated with stress: depression, anxiety, a sense of being
overwhelmed, and in extreme cases, panic. 34 The literature uses
several terms of art to describe this collection of symptoms:
technostress, information anxiety, or information fatigue syndrome.35
The information overload problem is not an abstract theoretical
conjecture. Various sociological studies have demonstrated that these
cognitive limits are commonly breached in our daily life in a range of
NETWORKS AND ISDN SYS. 17, 17-41 (1987); Dyi-Yih Michael Lin, Hypertextfor the Aged:
Effects of Text Topologies, 19 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 201, 201-09 (2003).
Disorientation or "getting lost in hyperspace" is defined as "the user not having a clear
conception of the relationships within the system or knowing his present location in the
system relative to the display structure and finding it difficult to decide where to look next
within the system." Cognitive overload is defined as the extra effort required in order to
maintain, at any given moment, routing information of several trails. As the web continues
to grow in volume, exploring its structure is becoming increasingly difficult and frustrating.
Many web users opt to use search engines to aid them in finding the information they
require, but are struggling to comprehend the displayed result list and, in addition, are
having difficulty in navigating the web page structure while trying to remain focused on the
goals of their original query. Mazlita Mat-Hassan & Mark Levene, Can Navigational
Assistance Improve Search Experience? A User Study, 6 FIRST MONDAY (No 9.) (Sept.
2OO1), http://www.firstmonday.org/ISSUES/issue6_q/mat/index.html (quoting W.C. Elm
& D.D. Woods, Getting Lost: A Case Study in Interface Design, PROC. AT THE HUMAN
FACrORS SOCY 29TH ANN. MEETING 927-31 (Santa Monica, Calif. 1985)).
32 See Himma, supra note 2; Levy, supra note 28; Zeldes, supra note 3; Troy A. Paredes,
Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, WASH. U. L. Q. 21, 23 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=41318o.
33 See, Paredes, supra note 32, at 21-22 (citing numerous studies demonstrating this
effect); but see Grether et al., supra note 2.
34 Himma, supra note 2, at lo.
35 Levy, supra note 28; Zeldes, supra note 3.
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domains or roles (e.g., work, home, and politics).36 This condition of
cognitive stress seems to be a side effect of modernity and the hectic
pace it imposes on us. It seems to reflect a more general phenomenon
that William Scheuerman has called the "busyness" of modern life.
The condition of "busyness," Scheuerman argues, adversely influences
the political sphere because it leaves little private space for political
engagement. 37
Citizens can employ different coping strategies in response to this
cognitive pressure, all of which lead to less-informed citizen
engagement. One type of coping strategy could involve the adoption
of simpler decision strategies that could resolve some of the search
and processing challenges raised by the abundance of political data.
Such strategies-which will usually involve the use of various
heuristics-should allow citizens to economize on the cognitive effort
associated with making political decisions.38 According to this view,
political deliberation and decision-making is not based on extensive
deliberation and reflection (as imagined by Habermas) but on various
political heuristics. Instead of studying the issue at stake-reflecting
on the diverse questions it raises and exploring the views of other
stakeholders-people tend to rely on various cognitive cues. Thus, in
forming an opinion on a certain issue, citizens may rely on the fact
that a certain view was endorsed by a political leader they trust, rather
than reflecting on the issue themselves; and in making a decision they
may rely on the candidate's party affiliation, rather than on studying
his resum6 or views. 39 At the limit, when the cognitive effort
associated with political action is seen as too large, citizens may
choose to withdraw completely from the political arena.40
Citizens may therefore be willing to take part in the democratic
process, but only under conditions of intentional ignorance, drawing
36 Id.; see also Jeanne Mengis & M.J. Eppler, The Concept of Information Overload: A
Review of Literature from Organization Science, Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and
Related Disciplines, 20 THE INFO. Soc'Y: AN INT'L J. 325, 325-44 (2004); Zeldes, supra
note 3; Paredes, supra note 32, at 21-23.
37 William E. Scheuerman, Busyness and Citizenship, 72 Soc. REs. 447 (2005).
38 This argument draws on Herbert Simon's pioneering work on human's reasoning. See,
e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
39 Michael Schudson, America's Ignorant Voters, 24 THE WILSON Q. 19 (2004); Richard R.
Lau & Jack S. Levy, Contributions of Behavioural Decision Theory to Research in Political
Science, 47 APPLIED PSYCHOL. 29, 36 (1998).
4o Scheuerman, supra note 37.
PEREZ2009]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
on various heuristics. There are several studies that demonstrate that
the narrative of "intentional ignorance" provides a better description
of contemporary political life, relative to the counter image of the
informed citizen. 41 The description of the contemporary political
culture as one based on "low information rationality" also has
important sociological implications.42 It means that the dissemination
of more information to the public domain will not necessarily lead to a
more complex discursive environment. Placing more political data in
the public domain, using the remarkable storing and dissemination
capacities of the Internet, cannot guarantee (in itself) that this
information will be picked up in the deliberation process. Further,
increasing the amount of available political data could lead citizens to
increase their reliance on various heuristics, making their political
interventions less, rather than more, informed. Thus, counter-
intuitively, the provision of more information could enlarge the gap
between actual citizens' behavior and the ideal of informed political
engagement, leading to a discursively impoverished political sphere.
The gap between the image of the "informed citizen" (which, as we
saw, also underlies the administrative law doctrine of transparency)
and actual citizenship behavior can also lead to a cyclical process that
further supports ignorant political action. If, for example, regulators
do not expect to receive informed comments to consultative processes,
they may develop a dismissive attitude to the comments they do
receive, treating them as "cheap talk." This may be especially true of
comments received by e-mail because of the low cost of sending such
messages and the technical capacity to send numerous messages
through automated services. This regulatory attitude can further
reduce citizens' motivation to collect relevant data before sending
comments, since citizens do not expect their comments-especially
those made online-to be taken seriously, further exacerbating the
dismissive attitude of government officials, and so on. A similar
process may be experienced in more deliberative democratic
processes, in which the shallowness of the deliberation crowds-out
more informed contributions.43
41 Schudson, supra note 39; SUSAN JACOBY, THE AGE OF AMERICAN UNREASON (2008).
42 See Doris Graber, Mediated Politics and Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century, 55
ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 545 (2004).
43 For initial empirical exploration, see Quentin Jones, Gilad Ravid & Sheizaf Rafali,
Empirical Evidence for Information Overload in Mass Interaction, Interactive Posters:
Internet, PROC. OF ACM CHI 2001, CONF. ON HUM. FACrORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 2001 vol. 2
177.
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The foregoing discussion challenges our common conceptions of
the democratic enterprise in its theoretical, practical, and legal
aspects. In theoretical terms, this discussion questions the extent to
which the image of the informed citizen provides a useful paradigm in
thinking about democracy. In particular, it questions the extent to
which the legitimacy of political decisions should depend on a
collective, wide-ranging process of informed reflection. It also
questions the extent to which a more transparent political
environment can lead to a more complex and pluralistic political
discussion. In terms of the legal structure underpinning our
democratic practices, especially regarding the rules governing the
provision of information by state agencies and the structure of
government consultation, we have to consider to what extent these
legal structures contribute to the robustness of the institution of
democracy. Finally, to the extent that we are not willing to give up the
normative commitment to the ideals of "informed citizenship" and
deliberative complexity, this sober analysis of citizens' cognitive
capacities emphasizes the need to explore new techniques for storing
and presenting politically relevant information, as well as new forms
of consultation, which will take this problem into account.
III. A SHALLOWER DEMOCRACY? Low-INFORMATION POLITICS AND
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL INTERMEDIARIES
A pragmatic conception of democracy, especially one that focuses
on the possible contribution of the Internet to the reinvigoration of
the democratic process, needs to take into account the problem of
information overload. One possible response is to rethink our
understanding of democracy. Our normative intuitions about the
nature of democracy may be ill-conceived. The starting point for such
an alternative account of democracy is the argument that Habermas's
informationally expansive conception of democratic legitimization is
not sensitive enough to the cognitive limitations of the human mind.
As I argued above, the behavioral practices that characterize modern
democracies, as documented by various political scientists, seem to
reflect indeed a gap between the paradigm of the "informed citizen"
and the cognitive capacities of "real" citizens.44 Drawing on this
empirical gap, political scientists have argued that we should
reconceptualize our understanding of democracy and good
citizenship. Michael Schudson, for example, argues that our
44 See the survey in Graber, supra note 42.
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constitutional thinking should be guided by an alternative idea- the
"monitorial citizen."45 The concept of the "monitorial citizen" is based
on the vision of a citizen who delegates part of his discretion to
political professionals, but at the same time is "watchful, even while he
or she is doing something else,"46 and who is prepared to deal with
particular political issues as they arise. In some ways, Schudson
argues, the paradigm of "monitorial citizen" implies a more
demanding form of citizenship than the one stipulated by the
"informed citizen" model because:
[it] implies that one's peripheral vision should always have a
political or civic dimension. But it does not imply that
citizens should know all the issues all of the time. It implies
that they should be informed enough and alert enough to
identify danger to their personal good and danger to the
public good. When such danger appears on the horizon, they
should have the resources- in trusted relationships, in
political parties and elected officials, in relationships to
interest groups and other trustees of their concerns, in
knowledge of and access to the courts as well as the electoral
system, and in relevant information sources to jump into the
political fray and make a lot of noise.47
Other writers have argued that the reality of a political culture
based on "low information rationality" expressed in the writings of
Michael Schudson, Samuel Popkin, Arthur Lupia, and others,48 is not
a sociological anomaly of the modern society, but a reflection of the
proper structure of democracy in complex and large societies.
Citizens, Doris Graber argues, "can perform their political obligations
effectively on a low-information diet, supported by an array of well-
developed decision shortcuts."49 The vision of directly deliberated
democracy is, under this view, incompatible with the sociological and
45 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 240-93,
308-09, 311 (1999).
46 Id. at 311.
47 Schudson, supra note 45.
48 Graber, supra note 42, at 562; SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER:
COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1991).
49 Graber, supra note 42, at 563.
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psychological realities of living in today's world, and as such, should
also be rejected as a normative yardstick.
The argument of Schudson and Graber highlights the important
role of political intermediaries-political parties, civic groups, unions,
religious leaders, mass-media, academics, and corporations-in the
democratic process. These intermediaries interpret and analyze
politically-relevant information and generate those cognitive cues to
which the general public responds. 50 In this way, political
intermediaries enable citizens to make political decisions without
being fully informed themselves. The result of this mediated process
will be rational in the sense of being consistent with citizens'
preferences, reflective of the facts at issue, and open to the arguments
and interests of other participants. According to this view, extensive
deliberation about policy questions rarely takes place at the level of
the "simple citizenry." Rather, these discursive processes are
controlled by political intermediaries, and consequently also take
place in restricted institutional contexts. As Graber observed:
While average citizens play important political roles in
democracies, the bulk of the burden for political action has
always been born by elected and appointed public officials
and by citizens with above-average interest in politics whom
scholars call 'the attentive public.' At best, that category
comprises no more than 10% of the citizenry .... Complex
modem societies require intermediaries between citizens and
elected and appointed public officials. Relatively small
groups of attentive citizens have always served that role
along with political parties and interest groups. These
proxies relieve the majority of citizens of the burden of
continuously monitoring public problems and pondering
solutions. Political elites benefit immensely from the new
information resources provided by modem technologies,
especially the Internet. To the extent that they use this
information to formulate better policy choices, and
disseminate their views via mass media, the mass public
50 Id. at 563-64. Three good examples of web-based political intermediaries are
MoveOn.org, http://www.moveon.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2009); mySociety.org,
http://www.mysociety.org/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2009); and TheyworkForYou.com,
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
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benefits from this information treasure trove, albeit via a
two-step transmission process.
5 1
Graber and Schudson's political account reformulates our
normative expectations regarding good citizenship, reducing the
current gap between the observed patterns of political behavior and
the behavioral ideal. This normative re-conceptualization downplays
the significance of information overload to the function of modem
democracy. 52 While the empirical observations of the "political
heuristics" literature cannot be dismissed,53 its normative argument
about the role of political intermediaries in the political process and
the nature of "sound" political reasoning at the citizen level is
unconvincing as a normative account of democracy.
First, Graber and Schudson ignore the deep gap between their
"low-information" understanding of democracy and the emergence of
transparency as a key principle of modern national and global
administrative law. It is wrong to dismiss this jurisprudential
development as an isolated legal phenomenon with no repercussions
in society. Rather, the widespread dispersal of the doctrine of
transparency reflects deep social intuitions and expectations about the
meaning of citizenship in a democratic society.
Second, the narrative of mediated democracy seems to ignore the
question of the legitimacy and trustworthiness of political
intermediaries. These questions mean that even if we take the
discursive intervention of political intermediaries as an inevitable
feature of modem political life, the question of how the work of
51 Graber, supra note 42, at 563-64.
52 Graber notes in this context that: "For aficionados of the informed citizen model it may
seem heresy to argue that democracy is well served even when most citizens leave most
civic tasks, including information collection and policy appraisal, to elites. They should be
reminded that direct democracy has never been a constitutional pattern in the United
States. Policies and laws have always been made and executed by elites, with most citizens
limiting themselves to serving as periodic monitors through electoral mechanisms. The
end has been a serviceable, if not ideal, democracy." Id. at 564.
53 In particular, I do not disagree with the empirical observation that political
intermediaries play an important role in the life of modern democracies. See Perez, supra
note 19 (noting the role of NGOs in global governance processes); Oren Perez, Facing the
Global Hydra: Ecological Transformation at the Global Financial Frontier: The
Ambitious Case of the Global Reporting Initiative, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL
TRADE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION (C. Joerges & E.U. Petersmann eds., 2oo6)
(noting the role of intermediaries in interpreting complex environmental data in the
context of corporate environmental reports).
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political intermediaries should be woven into our normative
conceptualization of democracy requires deep reflection.
Samuel Issacharoff and Daniel R. Ortiz examined the question of
political mediation through the lens of the principal-agency problem,
distinguishing between primary and secondary agency costs. 54
Political intermediation, they argue, can enable citizens to better
choose their elected officials and enable them to better monitor and
control their actions. As such, political intermediation can bring down
the direct agency costs that would ensue if citizens had to undertake
this overseeing and monitoring task themselves. In this way, political
intermediation promotes democracy by helping to overcome the
principal-agent problems inherent in representation. However,
political intermediaries are second-order agents;S5 their activity thus
raises a new set of questions associated with their representative
status. Issacharoff and Ortiz highlight, in particular, that the problem
is superagency costs. These costs reflect potential conflicts of interest
between political intermediaries and citizens. The political
intervention of the intermediary may be geared toward promoting her
interests, rather than those of her principal.56
Issacharoff and Ortiz focus on three types of political super-
agents: corporations, unions, and political parties. 57 However, their
argument can be generalized across the whole spectrum of political
intermediaries. The agency-principal dilemma calls into question the
extent to which the various political intermediaries can be trusted in
54 Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REv.
1627, 1632 (1999).
55 They are, in economic terms, super-agents.
56 Id. at 1632. Another problem noted by Issacharoff and Ortiz is enhanced rent-seeking.
By advocating an interest more powerfully than any of their individual principals could,
super-agents can more effectively exert pressure on political officials to pursue certain
policies. This may cause a cleavage between the interests of super-agent and the principal
because the super-agent will not take into account the effects of its successful lobbying on
the principal's overall welfare (taking into account only the narrow field in which the
super-agent represents the principal). Id. Thus, for example, an individual who holds
shares of a mobile phones producer may have an interest in curtailing policies that will
force the latter to take costly measures to limit the radioelectric radiation emitted by
phones, based on the precautionary principle (to the extent that this will reduce the
corporation's profits). However, such policy might harm the shareholder's overall welfare,
if he is exposed to a substantial amount of (possibly damaging) radiation. Because the
corporation superintends only a narrow range of the shareholder's interests, the
corporation may nonetheless lobby to curtail such policy.
57 Id. at 1635.
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representing the interests of either their principals (e.g., in the case of
unions, NGOs, and corporations) or of society as a whole (e.g., media
and academic scholars). For example, environmental groups may
select their agenda not because of its ecological significance, but
because of its projected value to organizational survival. Journalists
are subject to severe economic constraints in picking their stories.
Finally, even the contribution of academics is not devoid of selective
biases. Academic work is produced under a range of institutional
pressures, such as the need to publish in order to get tenure (which
may encourage intellectual conservatism), availability of grants, and
institutional constraints reflecting the culture of the academic
institution in which the research is undertaken. The argument that
political deliberation can take place exclusively through the
communicative cues generated by political intermediaries seems,
therefore, highly problematic. 58 If, as I argued, the discursive
contribution of political intermediaries may be skewed, citizens must
be endowed with the tools to criticize these contributions. This can
only be achieved through access to high quality information.
Third, democracy takes place on various levels, and it is not clear
that we want to give up the ideal of direct deliberation at all levels of
government. It might be that the hope of achieving a wide-ranging
and informed discussion on national trade policy is misplaced, but
such discussion can be achieved in the context of local dilemmas (e.g.,
planning), or in concrete contexts (e.g., rules on organic food).
Finally, information overload is not just a problem of the "average
citizen"; it may also hinder the work of the more sophisticated
political elite.59 This may undermine the theoretical basis for the
mediated model, which is based, as Issacharoff and Ortiz argue, on the
claim that political intermediation helps to overcome the first-order
principal-agent problem, which characterizes representative
democracies.
58 See Mark E. Warren, Deliberative Democracy andAuthority, 90 AM. POL ScI REv. 46
(1996).
59 For an example of empirical analysis of information overload at the elite level, see Robert
Orton et al., An Observational Study of the Information Seeking Behaviour of Members
of Parliament in the United Kingdom, 25 ASLIB PROC. 207 (2000).
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IV. RE-IMAGINING THE TECHNO-LEGAL APPARATUS SUPPORTING
ONLINE DELIBERATION AND CONSULTATION
The principle of transparency and the associated right to
information reflect a commitment to a political regime that values the
contribution of its citizenry to the political process. However, the
doctrinal structures in which the principle of transparency is
embedded are not sensitive enough to the problem of information
overload. The assumption that loading web-sites with information
and providing simple electronic contact opportunities can facilitate
robust citizen engagement of the kind imagined by Habermas is not
supported by empirical research. The question is to what extent new
web and computer technology can allow citizens to reach beyond the
cognitive and attentive limitations described above. To answer this
question, I want to imagine digital democracy through the lens of the
web of tomorrow, looking at several technological innovations, some
of which are still in an embryonic stage. In exploring these possible
technological fixes, I will also consider their blind-spots and hidden
biases.
In exploring new web technologies, we need to keep in mind the
various cognitive and social failings to which they respond. At the
individual level, these new web technologies respond both to the
increasing costs of search in a data-saturated environment and to the
increasing processing costs associated with extensive data streams. 60
At the collective level, the new web technologies seek to create a
deliberative framework that could encourage informed and
thematically rich deliberative process. It should be noted, finally, that
my argument regarding the possible cognitive efficacy of the various
technologies described below is somewhat speculative. Evaluating
how each of these technologies influences the dynamic of political life
will require careful empirical studies, which will examine their impact
in diverse political contexts. 61
60 Note that some technologies influence both search and processing costs.
61 For a preliminary study that seeks to tackle this empirical question, see Cary Coglianese,
The Internet and Citizen Participation in Rulemaking, i ISJLP 33 (2005) (concluding that
digitizing the rule-making process is unlikely to increase substantially both the level of
participation and its quality).
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A. SOPHISTICATED SEARCH TECHNOLOGIES: POLITICAL AGENTS,
TAGGING AND NATURAL LANGUAGE SEARCH
Searching for politically relevant information on the Internet can
be a highly complex task. The costs associated with such searches can
substantially hinder informed political involvement. Let us consider
two concrete examples. An environmentally conscious U.S. citizen,
who is contemplating how to vote in the 2008 presidential election,
may want to find information about the environmental agenda of the
competing presidential candidates. However, getting an answer to
this question will require a non-trivial search on the Internet. A mere
Google search will probably not provide a good enough answer. It is
possible that someone (e.g., environmental group or a think tank) has
the answer- but the voter will have to find it.62
Similar problems may arise in more bounded data-environments
and in the context of unique search engines. The results of an
experiment conducted by Cary Coglianese provide an insightful
example. Coglianese examined the ability of students at Harvard's
Kennedy School of Government to locate regulatory information on
the Internet. The students were given information about four rules
proposed by two federal agencies, the DOT and the EPA, and were
asked to find a specific numbered document in the docket for each
rulemaking. 63 This exercise has simulated the challenge a typical user
might face, in an attempt to find out more about a proposed rule.
Coglianese found that even these graduate students, who were
interested in regulation and adept at using the Internet, had a difficult
time locating the right dockets within the time allotted. On average,
the Kennedy School students could find only half of the dockets they
were instructed to locate.64 1 suspect that similar results can be
expected in other domains. Thus, for example, the search portal of the
62 For initial answers to this question, see 2008 Presidential Election Forum,
http://www.2oo8presidentialelectionforum.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2009); see also
Maryland Pro-Life News and Commentary, http://defendlife.blogspot.com/2oo8/oi/us-
presidential-candidates-evaluated.html (evaluation of 20o8 Presidential Candidates
against U.S. Bishops' Criteria). In the previous elections in Israel I have done (together
with my students at the environmental clinic) a similar exercise. It took several weeks to
compile the relevant information (some of which was not even available on the web).
63 The U.S. Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) is now managed by a new
website: http://www.Regulations.gov. This site includes a redesigned search engine and
user interface, but the experiment was conducted using the previous docket system.
64 Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55
DUKE L.J. 943,965-66 (20o6).
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World Trade Organization offers users multiple and quite intricate
research options, which I think are likely to cause a non-expert to
quickly find herself at a loss when executing a search.6s
The technological vision of the Semantic Web aims to provide a
more sophisticated solution to the search dilemma.6 6 The Semantic
Web will create a new infrastructure that will enable people to search
for data more efficiently through software agents, relying on natural
language. Unlike the current Internet, which is oriented toward
human understanding, the Semantic Web is constituted of actionable
information- information that can be "understood" by software
agents through the employment of a semantic theory for interpreting
symbols. The semantic theory provides an account of "meaning" in
which the logical connection of terms establishes interoperability
between systems. 67 Generally the Semantic Web is based on three
basic technologies: (i) a common language for representing data that
can be understood by software agents; (2) ontologies (common
taxonomies defining classes of objects and relations among them that
will allow us to translate information from multiple databases into
common terms); and (3) rules of inference that allow software agents
to reason about the information described using those common
terms.68
The Semantic Web is still in its early days, and it may take several
years before its technological vision will materialize. In the meantime,
it is possible to improve political search technologies using more
primitive techniques. We can imagine, for example, the design of a
special pre-election website in which candidates or competing parties
disclose their agendas, ordered by common terms. This mechanism
will not only assist citizens to search political data on the Net; it will
also reduce some of the processing costs by allowing them to compare
candidates' views on the issues that they find most important. One
way in which this can be done is by using a "tagging" system, such as
65 See World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/docs-e.htm (last
visited Jan. 2, 2009).
66 Ian Horrocks, Semantic Web: The Story so Far, 225 ACM INT'L CONF. PROC. SER., 120
(W4A 2007).
67Nigel Shadbolt, Tim Berners-Lee & Wendy Hall, The Semantic Web Revisited, 21 IEEE
INTELLIGENT SYS. 96 (2006).
68 Id.; Tim Berners-Lee, James Hendler & Ora Lassila, The Semantic Web, SCIENTIFIC AM.
34 (May 2001); Lee Feigenbaum, Ivan Herman, Tonya Hongsermeier, Eric Neumann &
Susie Stephens, The Semantic Web in Action, SCIENTIFIC AM. 9o (Dec. 2007).
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the one used by Digg, MySpace, and Flickr. The tagging system allows
browsers to find the tagged information, drawing on the taxonomy
used in this domain. This technological solution is more primitive
than the Semantic Web technology because each tagging system is
unique to the domain (e.g. Flickr's tags may be different from those of
MySpace). Still, it offers significant benefits to users.69 Several new
digital consultation frameworks, such as the one provided by the U.S.
government (www.regulations.gov) and a counterpart from the
Scottish government (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Consultations),
represent initial steps in this direction, although their search options
are much more primitive than those imagined by the Semantic Web.70
B. USER-SENSITIVE DESIGN
Current examples of e-democracy-which are still mostly
consultation exercises-tend to offer uniform service to citizens. 71
This practical uniformity draws on universal ideals of equality and
consistency. However, the procedural uniformity that permeates the
legal and pragmatic aspects of contemporary Western "democracy," is
not compatible with the reality of social and individual pluralism. At
the social level diversity is manifested in the multiple discourses,
which constitute society as a communicative domain. 72 At the
69 See Flickr, http://flickr.com/photos/tags/; Feigenbaum et al., supra note 68; Scott A.
Golder & Bernardo A. Huberman, The Structure of Collaborative Tagging Systems,
Information Dynamics Laboratory, HP Labs, available at
http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/tags/tags.pdf. Katz et al., offer to
incorporate a similar natural search system, based on manual annotation into the U.S.
digital rule-making framework, www.regulations.gov. Boris Katz et al., Better Public
Policy Through Natural Language Information Access, 13o ACM INT'L CONF. PROC. SER. 1
(2003).
70 For a discussion of the search features of www.regulations.gov, see Katz et al., supra note
69.
7For surveys of U.S. and European initiatives, see Cogliansese, supra note 64; Paskaleva-
Shapira Krassimira, Transitioning From E-Government to E-Governance in the
Knowledge Society: The Role of the Legal Framework for Enabling the Process in the
European Union's Countries, 151 ACM INT'L CONF. PROC. SER. 181 (20o6).
72 See Niklas Luhmann, Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges: Law's
Proceduralization: The Communicative Model, Systems, and Order: Quod Omnes Tangit:
Remarks on Jurgen Habermas's Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 883 (1996); Thomas
McCarthy, Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges: Laws, Morals, and
Ethics: Legitimacy and Diversity: Dialectical Reflections on Analytical Distinctions, 17
CARDOZO L. REv. 1083, 1121 (1996). This pluralistic vision puts in doubt the capacity of a
political community to reach an agreement through rational deliberation, as imagined by
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individual level, diversity reflects people's distinct innate structures.
It refers to people's different beliefs, concerns and cultural baggage as
well as their varied cognitive capacities and personality profile. It also
reflects socio-economic differences, including personal wealth and
social background. These differences influence people's political
concerns, their willingness to engage in political activities, and their
ability to do so.73 The deep plurality of human society calls the logic of
uniform e-democracy models into question.
The plasticity of the Internet makes it an ideal medium for
responding to this pluralistic challenge. In particular, it enables the
design of participatory structures that can cater to the ideological
differences and psychological and cognitive diversities that
characterize political users. Modem web-technologies allow the
designer to create interfaces that are responsive to user profiles.74
There are also technologies that enable users to store their profiles in
one secured place over the Web, and to use it as they surf the Net and
interact with varied applications.75
both Habermas and Rawls. It suggests that in thinking about democratic legitimacy more
weight should be given to the challenge of designing institutional structures that could
facilitate thematically rich deliberative interactions.
73 See, e.g., Oren Perez, Electronic Democracy as a Multi-dimensional Praxis, 4 N.C. J. L.
&TECH 275 (2003); Judith R. Myers, Donna H. Henderson-King & Eaaron I. Henderson-
King, Facing Technological Risks: The Importance of Individual Differences, 31 J.
RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 1 (1997); Y. Amichai-Hamburger, Internet and Personality, 18
COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 1, 5-6 (2002); Y. Amichai-Hamburger, Personality,
Individual Differences and Internet Use, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNET PSYCHOLOGY
(forthcoming) (A. Joinson, K. McKenna, T. Postmes & U. Reips eds., 2007).
74 Troyer et al., supra note 31; Ralf Isenmann et al., Customized Corporate Environmental
Reporting by Internet-Based Push and Pull Technologies, 8 ECO-MGMT & AUDITING (NO.
2) 100 (2001); Javier Sevilla et al., Web Accessibility for Individuals with Cognitive
Deficits: A Comparative Study Between an Existing Commercial Web and its Cognitively
Accessible Equivalent, ACM 14 TRANS. COMPUTER-HUM. INTERACTION 12 (2007); Barry
McMullin, Users with Disability Need Not Apply? Web Accessibility in Ireland, 7 FIRST
MONDAY (NO. 12) (Dec. 2002), http://www.firstmonday.org/Issues/issue7_12/mcmullin/;
J. J. Jahng et al., Personality Traits and Effectiveness of Presentation of Product
Information in E-Business Systems, 11 EURO. J. INFO. SYS. 181 (2002); Benoit Encelle &
Nadine Baptiste-Jessel, Personalization of User Interfaces for Browsing XML Content
Using Transformations Built on End-User Requirements, 225 ACM INT'L CONF. PROC.
SER. 58 (2007); Brian Kelly et al., Accessibility 2.0: People, Policies and Processes, 225
ACM INT'L CONF. PROC. SER. 138 (2007).
75 For an example of such technology, see Pageone, https://www.pageonce.com (last visited
Jan. 2, 2009).
PEREZ2009]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
C. USING NEW VISUALIZATION TECHNIQUES TO SUPPORT ONLINE
CONSULTATION
Visual presentation is an important mechanism for reducing
complexity. 76 It can reduce the cognitive costs associated with
searching for and deciphering information. This can be achieved
through multiple tools. One type of visualization tool focuses on the
cognitive difficulties associated with the search task itself, irrespective
of the information sought. This type of visual tool can assist users by
incorporating graphical representations in the user interface, thus
reducing some of the cognitive difficulties associated with the search
task.77 A second type of tool offers ways to represent the data, the
object of the search, through visual means such as charts, graphs,
drawings, pictures, and maps. The claim that visual aids can enhance
understanding received support in numerous studies,78 although the
extent of this impact depends upon context (e.g., the task for which
76 For the argument that visualization can enhance understanding, see, e.g., Isaac M.
Lipkus & J. G. Hollands, The Visual Communication of Risk, 1999 J. NAT'L CANCER INST.
MONOGR. 149 (1999).
77 Mat-Hassan & Levene, supra note 31 (reporting on a search and navigation engine called
NavZone that incorporates the concept of a trail both at the system and user interface
levels in order to improve users' experience when "surfing" the Web). The new search
engine, http://www.cuil.com, employs a different visualization strategy by presenting the
results in a 3x3 matrix (in contrast to Google's single column approach). This allows Cul
to provide more information about each of the findings and also to include in the results
images taken from the (extracted) websites.
78 Lipkus & Hollands, supra note 76; Gary W. Dickson, Gerardine DeSanctis & D. J.
McBride, Understanding the Effectiveness of Computer Graphics for Decision Support: A
Cumulative ExperimentalApproach, 29 COMMUN. ACM (No. 1) 40 (1986); S. L. Jarvenpaa
& Gary W. Dickson, Graphics and Managerial Decision Making: Research-Based
Guidelines, 31 COMMUN. ACM (No. 6) 764 (1988); E. Hoadley, Investigating the Effects of
Color, 33 COMMUN. ACM (No. 2) 120 (1990); Stephen M. Casner, Task-Analytic Approach
to the Automated Design of Graphic Presentations, 1O ACM TRANS. GRAPH. (No. 2) 111
(1991); Cheri Speier, The Influence of Information Presentation Formats on Complex Task
Decision-Making Performance, 64 INT. J. HuM.-COMPUT. STUD. (No. 11) 1115 (2006);
Joachim Meyer, Marcia Kuskin Shamo & Daniel Gopher, Information Structure and the
Relative Efficacy of Tables and Graphs, 41 HuMAN FACTORS: THE J. OF THE HUM.FACTORS
AND ERGONOMICS SOC'Y 570, (1999); Piotr Jankowski & Milosz Stasik, Spatial
Understanding and Decision Support System: A Prototype for Public GIS, 2
TRANSACTIONS IN GIS (No. 1) 73 (1997); Katy Appleton & Andrew Lovett, GIS-Based
Visualization of Development Proposals: Reactions From Planning and Related
Professionals, 29 COMPUTERS, ENV'T AND URB. Sys. (No. 3) 321 (2005); I. Svedung & J.
Rasmussen, Graphic Representation ofAccident Scenarios: Mapping System Structure
and the Causation ofAccidents, 40 SAFETY SCI. (No. 5) 397 (2002).
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the information is sought)79 and user personality characteristics.s °
Politically oriented websites have already begun to make use of these
visual technologies81 In the context of resource management and
planning, one of the prominent visualization techniques is Geographic
Information Systems (GIS). GIS is a collection of computer hardware,
software, and geographic data for capturing, managing, analyzing, and
displaying all forms of geographically referenced information.8 2
While it is generally agreed that visualization can enhance
understanding at least in some contexts, the use of visual aids-
especially GIS-has been widely criticized.8 3 The critics point out that
despite the objective look of visual representations such as maps and
photos, they are in fact the product of unstated selections. The design
of maps or the production of photos reflects the work of various
technical choices. The layers of a GIS map or the point from which a
79 Graphical representation may be superior to other forms of representation when there is
a cognitive fit between the information emphasized in the representation format and that
required by the task. Thus, for example, while tables emphasize symbolic data and lead to
better performance for the task of reading individual data values, graphs emphasize spatial
information and lead to better performance (relative to numerical presentation) for most
elementary spatial tasks, including summarizing data, conveying trends, comparing points
and patterns of different variables, forecasting, and showing deviations. Jarvenpaa &
Dickson, supra note 78. Graphs may also affect attentional processes through a vividness
effect, attracting and holding people's attention because of their concrete and visual form
of displaying information. Lipkus & Hollands, supra note 76.
so Jahng et al., supra note 74.
81 For examples of using visual aids in consultation regarding local planning projects, see
http://www.veteransglasscityskyway.org/4_public.htm (dealing with the construction of a
new, massive bridge over the Maumee River, Toledo, Ohio: The Veterans' Glass City
Skyway) and http://www.scudderfallsbridge.com/public.htm (dealing with a 140 million
dollar project to improve the 1-95/Scudder Falls Bridge over the Delaware River). Another
example is BP Sustainability worldwide map (http://www.bp.com: environment and
society), which allows users to find out information about BP actions by clicking on a
global map).
12 See Geographic Information Systems, http://www.gis.com/whatisgis/; see also
Participatory GIS, http://pgis2oo5.cta.int/background.htm. For a good example of a
website using GIS technology to disseminate information to the public, see
http://www.saferoadmaps.org/home/index.htm (providing visual representation of traffic
safety across the United States).
83 See, e.g., Renee Sieber, Public Participation Geographic Information Systems: A
Literature Review and Framework, 96 ANNALS ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 491 (20o6);
Kevin S. Ramsey & Matthew W. Wilson, Rethinking the 'Informed' Participant:
Precautions and Recommendations for the Design of Online Deliberation, in ONLINE
DELIBERATION: DESIGN, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (T. Davies ed., CSLI Publications 2008).
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photo is taken may be a product of economic, aesthetic, or political
pressures. The impression that maps or photos open a window to
reality uninfluenced by ideology is ungrounded. 84 The problem is that
hidden selections underlying these representational mechanisms may
pre-determine, or at least put into a certain course, the consultation
process, and thus could undermine the whole purpose of an open
deliberative process.
D. DELIBERATION AND SUPPORT TECHNOLOGIES: WIKIS AND MORE
A frequent mistake in scholarly thought regarding information
overload in the democratic context is the consideration that it is a
static problem. This view-which can be denoted the "encyclopedic"
narrative-conceptualizes the problem as one of extracting and
evaluating data from a huge unchanging database. 85 The
"encyclopedic" narrative suffers from two key flaws. First, the
Internet has changed the nature of knowledge by turning traditional
data sources-encyclopedias or libraries-into highly dynamic
knowledge environments. The emergence of Wikipedia is the most
vivid example of this process. This means that people cannot trust the
results of a Wikipedia search conducted "yesterday" because of its
potential for frequent change. Second, and more important, the
cognitive challenge facing the citizen as she enters the political
domain is dialectical. Thus, a citizen seeking to participate in a public
debate about a certain issue has to constantly track the diverse claims
or positions that are invoked by different participants, the reasons
that are used to justify them, and how the debate unfolds with respect
to each of these claims; that is, whether certain claims were retracted
or defeated by better arguments. This cognitive challenge can take
place across multiple discursive domains, involving various modes of
justification.
These individual cognitive challenges can influence the dialectical
features of the deliberation process. From an informational
perspective, it is possible to assess a deliberation process using two
different dimensions. The first dimension involves the question of
84 Ramsey & Wilson, supra note 83; Sarah Elwood, Critical Issues in Participatory GIS:
Deconstructions, Reconstructions, and New Research Directions, io TRANSACTIONS IN GIS
(NO. 5) 693,693-708 (2006).
85 This image underlies the experiment conducted by Cary Coglianese to examine the
barriers facing citizens in searching for regulatory materials. Coglianese, supra note 64, at
965-66.
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inclusiveness: to what extent the political discussion has considered
all the relevant issues and provided a voice for all the relevant
stakeholders. "Relevance" can be defined in this context either
through the perspective of the participants or in view of some external
normative criteria. The second dimension refers to the
responsiveness of the dialogical process.8 6 "Responsiveness" refers to
the extent to which the discussion addressed all the relevant questions
and objections, which were raised by the participants, leading to a
decision that is reasonably justified and not arbitrary. Reasonable
justification is not a measure of logical correctness, but rather
represents the decision's cogency or reasonableness, which in turn is a
reflection of the decision's discursive responsiveness.8 7
Today, there are several types of computer supported
argumentation and collaborative decision-making systems. 88 The
most popular and widely used system is the Wild platform, but there
are various other systems, which were developed by computer
scientists (in collaboration with legal scholars and political scientists)
and were tested in various issue domains, such as Zeno and Hermes. 89
Generally, these systems seek to fulfill several functions.90 First, a
deliberation support system provides a forum in which to undertake
dialogue. By creating formal protocols in which any discursive
contribution needs to be made, the system provides a structured space
in which participants interact. In other words, the system can make
sure that the discursive contributions satisfy certain argumentation
86 William Rehg, Peter McBurney & Simon Parsons, Computer Decision-Support Systems
for Public Argumentation: Assessing Deliberative Legitimacy, 19 AI & Soc. 203, 216
(2005).
87 Id.; Consequently, arbitrariness refers to a decision that disregards some considerations
or voices which were relevant to the decision.
88 It is important to emphasize that these systems are restricted to a support function and
they do not play the role of participant or decision-maker.
89 See id., at 205-07 (discussing the Zeno system); Nikos Karacapilidis & Dimitris
Papadias Computer Supported Argumentation and Collaborative Decision Making: the
HERMES System, 26 INFO. SYS. 259 (2001) (discussing the Hermes system); see also P.
McBurney & S. Parsons, Intelligent Systems to Support Deliberative Democracy in
Environmental Regulation, io INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 79 (2001).
90 Rehg et al., supra note 86, at 209; B. Verheij, Automated Argument Assistancefor
Lawyers, in PROC. OF THE 7- INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 43-52
(ACM Press 1999).
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rules, pertaining, for example, to their justificatory form.91 Second,
these systems seek to support the participants in monitoring the
deliberation by tracking it as it unfolds. This monitoring involves,
first, keeping track of the issues that are raised and the assumptions
that are made, sorting out the different issues into distinct threads.
Third, with respect to each issue-thread, the system has to keep track
of the exchange of arguments and counter arguments noting the
reasons offered for each argument and the conclusions drawn.92 In
keeping track of the argumentation process these systems play a
record-keeping role, providing a complete description of the decision-
making process. Finally, these systems can also fulfill a more
problematic function of evaluating the justification status of the
statements made. In this role they can either reflect the conclusions
reached by the participants or use certain rules of inference that are
built into the system.
An interesting recent example of the use of a deliberation-support
system in a political context is the deliberative process initiated by
AccountAbility in 2008, using a Wild platform, with respect to the
revision of the AAiooo Assurance Standard.93 A wild is software that
allows users to create and edit content in a collaborative manner.94 By
drawing on a Wild platform to facilitate the collaborative drafting
process AccountAbility sought to address two challenges: access and
transparency. Thus, the introductory notes to the Wild state that
"[t]he wild makes it possible for thousands of individuals and
organizations to provide their input without facing access barriers
such as the cost of travel to meetings and the difficulty of cutting
through dominant voices. It also keeps a transparent record of
91 For the notion of argumentation rules, see Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, Debates and
Decisions: On a Rationale ofArgumentation Rules, 36 GAMEs & ECON. BEHAV. 158 (2001).
92 Deliberation support systems, like Zeno, can also support a human moderator or
mediator, who takes part in the debate as external observer, by identifying common
assumptions across different arguments. Rehg et al., supra note 86, at 209.
93 See AccountAbility AAsooo Wild,
http://www.accountabilityaaxooowild.net/index.php/Structure (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
The deliberation process has taken place in three phases of 6o-9o days. The three periods
ran from January 24 to April 4, 2008; April 30 to June 20, 2008; and July 7 to September
12, 2008. The final revised standard was published on October 24, 2008, see
http://www.accountability21.net (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
94 See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited Feb. 5,
2009).
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everyone who has participated as well as the nature of their input."95
The deliberation platform created by AccountAbility is not, however,
completely anarchic. The final authority to approve the standard
remained within the hands of the AccountAbility Standards Technical
Committee (ASTC). However, AccountAbility has committed to make
any interventions of the ASTC transparent (that is to publish them on
the Wiki).96
V. THE CASE OF TRANSLINK
TransLink is the South Coast British Columbia Transportation
Authority. It operates under the 2007 South Coast British Columbia
Transportation Authority Act. 97 It is responsible both for the
operation of various transportation services, from trains to buses, and
to the development of related infrastructure projects (railways, roads,
bridges, etc.). The scale of its responsibilities and the possible social
and environmental impacts of its actions are enormous. TransLink
states that it is firmly committed to public consultation:
At TransLink, public consultation drives everything that we
do- our transportation plans, policies and financial strategy.
We consult with the public through a variety of ways,
including open houses, forums, interactive online panels,
discussion groups and more.98
TransLink also commits itself to follow an internal consultation code
entitled "Principles for Public Consultation and Community
Engagement," which consists of nine principles:
9s Id.
96 See AccountAbility AAiooo Wild, The AccountAbility Standards Technical Committee,
http://www.accountabilityaaiooowiki.net/index.php/Main-Page (last visited Feb. 7,
2009).
97 TransLink- South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority,
http://www.TransLinkbc.ca/About-TransLink/default.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
98 Public consultation page, TransLink,
http://www.TransLink.bc.ca/Plans/PublicConsultation/default.asp (last visited Jan. 2,
2009) (access to the Consultation section is made available both through the opening page
and through a reference in the Plans section).
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1. Integrate public consultation into all applicable aspects of
TransLink's business.
2. Consider both local and regional perspectives.
3. Work with municipal partners.
4. Clearly define the parameters of the consultations.
5. Consult in advance of key decisions.
6. Be inclusive and accessible by offering a variety of
opportunities for input.
7. Ensure participants have the opportunity to provide informed
input.
8. Consider public input as advice.
9. Inform participants about the results of the consultation
process. 99
The foregoing principles are clearly based on the narrative of the
"informed citizen." They require TransLink to establish the necessary
conditions for "informed input," loo to consider "public input as
advice," and to "inform participants about the results of the
consultation process."1° 1
99 http://www.TransLink.bc.ca/Plans/PublicConsultation/default.asp#commeng (last
visited Jan. 2, 2009). The principles are further elaborated in the website.
loo The detailed elaboration of principle seven emphasizes TransLink's commitment to the
model of "informed citizenship": "Public consultation requires informed participants.
TransLink will ensure sufficiently comprehensive and accurate information in a variety of
formats is available to participants in a timely manner, and that opportunities for
interaction with TransLink representatives are provided, so questions can be answered as
part of the information-sharing process." TransLink- South Coast British Columbia
Transportation Authority,
http://www.translink.bc.ca/Plans/PublicConsultation/default.asp (last visited Feb. 5,
2009).
10, TransLink emphasizes that it will take seriously the public comments: "TransLink will
report to the public on the results of its consultation processes in a variety of locations and
formats, and will demonstrate how public input has been used in its decision-maldng
processes." Translink, supra note 99, at elaboration to principle nine.
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Clearly, TransLink's commitment to consultation is impressive,
but let us look more closely at the participatory framework that
TransLink has established. The consultation section offers two types
of data: general information about TransLink's participatory
commitments and links to "open" projects, in which citizens can get
involved.102 Each project includes consultation materials, an input
form (limited to 350 characters- hardly enough for the complex
projects led by TransLink), and contact details (telephone, email).
The project website also serves as a message board, announcing (non-
digital) meetings.
To make the discussion more concrete, I have chosen a particular
consultation:
the "Transport 2040" plan. This project seeks to develop a 3o-year
transportation strategy for the region. During the consultation phase
the Transport 2040 page included the following input page
0 3:
102 Id.
1oTransLink- South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority, Looking Forward
to 2oo9 and Beyond, http://www.translink.bc.ca/Plans/Transport_204o.asp, (last visited
Feb. 7,2009). The consultation phase has now ended. Transport 204o and the 2009 10-
Year Plan were approved by Translink board and transmitted to the Regional
Transportation Commissioner and the Mayors' Council.
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The consultation page provided interested citizens with various
types of data: general information, perspective summaries, meeting
minutes, meeting presentations, and perspectives. The "general
information" category included a project timeline document, which
provides detailed information concerning the consultation process,
including information on scheduled meetings. 1°4 The "timeline" paper
clarifies that the current consultation is only a first step, meant to help
TransLink to develop a draft strategy. In the second phase, the
proposed strategy will be posted on TransLinl's website and
circulated to stakeholders for comment.
Making an informed contribution to the strategic question put
forward by TransLink would obviously require an extensive
investment of cognitive resources. Yet, there is no clear focal point for
the discussion. TransLink does point to several key questions, which
presumably should lead the discussion at this stage, but the questions
-4 See TransLink- South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority, Timeline,
http://www.translink.be.ca/fies/pdf/2o4o/Tineline.pdf COast visited Feb. 7, 2009).
are not highlighted in the project website. Instead, they are included
at the end of the Discussion Guide.105 The key (and highly abstract)
questions highlighted by TransLink are:
1. What do you want your transportation experience to be like
in 2040?
2. What are the most important issues facing the regional
transportation system in the next 30 years?
3. What strategies should TransLink consider to address these
issues?
4. What strategies should be considered by other agencies that
are involved in or that impact the regional transportation
system?
5. In a financially constrained reality, what do you think the
difficult choices and trade-offs will be? What would be your
priorities?
Note that the foregoing questions involve a diversity of validity
claims. Thus, for example, how should the climate change problem
influence TransLink strategic plan? Answering this question requires
TransLink and the citizens participating in the debate to consider
empirical questions relating both to the science of climate change and
to the various carbon prints of alternative strategies, to consider the
normative aspects of the climate change dilemma and various
adaptation strategies, and to rethink the place of nature in society- an
ethical question.106
The Transport 2040 page is also very simple in its design, as are
the other project pages. It does not offer any visual decision aids,
which could have illustrated some of the transportation challenges
facing the region. Nor does it attempt to create a user-sensitive
environment. Given the cognitive complexity of the Transport 2040
consultation call, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that TransLink
105 TransLink, Strategy Discussion Guide (October 2007),
http://www.translink.bc.ca/files/pdf/204o/DiscussionGuide.pdf.
o6 Transportation issues may also involve aesthetic dilemmas (e.g., the new Calatrava
bridge at the entrance to Jerusalem discussed previously).
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will receive very few web-mediated comments, and the few that will be
sent will receive little weight in the formation of the draft strategy.
TransLink will probably rely on the work of its internal team, as well
as on the input received in the face-to-face meetings with
stakeholders. The situation may change at the second phase, in which
comments will be solicited to the draft strategic plan.
The most innovative feature of the TransLink consultation
framework is TransLink's On-Line Advisory Panel. °7 This tool allows
TransLink, in effect, to distinguish between committed and non-
committed participants, and to give more weight to the views of
committed citizens- those who are willing to invest more cognitive
resources in forming their comments. Citizens seeking to join the
Advisory Panel are asked to complete a profile questionnaire. By
opting-in to the On-Line Advisory Panel, participants enter into a
draw to win one of two prizes of $5oo each.1°8 TransLink sends the
Panel members surveys each month, which take five to ten minutes to
complete. 109 In the context of the Transport 2040 consultation
process, TransLink will use this mechanism to solicit input on the
draft strategy in the form of public opinion polls. Because the
Advisory Panel is used mainly for polls, and does not allow for "open"
comments or for interactive dialogue, its deliberative potential is quite
limited. Nonetheless, it highlights the potential benefit of
distinguishing between different classes of participants according to
their willingness to invest in the study of sought-after information.
107 See TransLink- South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority,
https://www.translinklistens.bc.ca/Login.aspx?fg=i (last visited Jan. 2, 2009).
1o8 The draw took place on September 2, 2oo8. TransLink has announced a new draw to
take place on March 2, 2009. For the rules of the current contest, see: TransLink Listens
Panel Contest Conditions for Registration Recruit Draw,
https://www.translinklistens.bc.ca/skin/images/en-
CA/Contest%2oRulesTransLink%2oListens%2oRecruitPhase4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2,
2009).
log It also promises to send each participant the results of each survey in which she takes
part. The On-Line Advisory Panel mechanism raises obvious questions of privacy.
TransLink states in that context that: "We will carefully protect your personal information
and ensure that your e-mail address is used solely for the on-line advisory panel, in
accordance with privacy legislation governing TransLink. Your opinions will be held in
complete confidence." https://www.translinklistens.bc.ca/Login.aspx?fg=l (last visited
Jan. 2, 2009).
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VI. CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN THE AGE OF TECHNO-INTERMEDIARIES
Recognizing the problematic political repercussions of information
overload highlights a significant blind spot in the Habermasian
account of democratic legitimacy. More information does not
necessarily lead to a more enlightened and complex public
deliberation. Rather, it points to an unresolved tension in the
contemporary doctrine of transparency. While the notion of
transparency draws on the paradigm of "informed citizenship," it gives
little attention to the question of what happens to the information that
is disclosed as a result of this legal intervention. The doctrinal
treatment of transparency has been inattentive to the cognitive
limitations of the human actor. The real challenge facing modem
administrative law is not just to bring the government (or other
players) to make more data available to the public-putting it "out
there"-but to find ways that will make this immense body of
information accessible and meaningful.
The question of information overload constitutes a difficult
political challenge. I argued above that this problem cannot be
dismissed simply by reformulating our conception of democracy. The
attempt to offer an account of democracy that is based solely on the
communicative intervention of political intermediaries is not
convincing both because it does not give sufficient weight to deeply
entrenched social intuitions regarding "good citizenship" and because
it disregards the significant agency costs associated with a political
intermediation.
The new nexus of cognitive-enhancing technologies described in
section C offers a fascinating response to the challenge of information
overload, which does not require us to abandon the faith in the idea of
"informed citizenship." However, when we consider the promise of
these new tools, we also need to evaluate their blind spots. The first
question, which lies beyond the scope of this article, focuses on the
extent to which these new technologies can actually change the
behavioral patterns that characterize the contemporary political
arena. While their capacity to reduce some of the cognitive burden
associated with searching and deciphering political data seems beyond
doubt, their ultimate impact on the political process remains at this
stage an open question. Answering this question will require
thorough and multifaceted empirical studies.11o One of the more
110 See, for example, Coglianese, supra note 61, for initial (and somewhat pessimistic)
study.
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intriguing questions this research will have to answer is whether and
how the increasing presence of the Internet in our daily life is
reprogramming us- that is, reformulating the way we think..' This
phenomenon, to the extent that it is indeed occurring, could obviously
also influence the way people reason in the political sphere.
A second blind spot of these new technologies has to do with their
"representation" function; that is, in the fact that these tools
manipulate, in diverse forms, the raw data (broadly defined) that they
claim to represent. The new Semantic Web and similar tagging
techniques are based on uniform taxonomies, which reconstruct the
universe of the Web through their ontological grid. User-sensitive
formats hold important advantages to users, but may also impose
upon them profiles or frames, which are not necessarily reflective of
their psychological attributes or ideological preferences. Visual aids,
such as GIS-based participatory mechanisms, are highly useful in
terms of their capacity to enhance understanding. However, the
translation of the raw data into maps, graphs, or charts involves
various and non-transparent choices, of which the user is not
necessarily aware. Deliberation support technologies may hinder
deliberation by restricting the forms of argument that can be invoked
in the system or by intimidating certain type of users due to complex
user interface.112
The various cognitive enhancing technologies described above are
the product of deeply opaque technical intermediation. The hidden
work of the multiple technical intermediaries associated with these
technologies can have a vast impact on the way in which the political
process unfolds. The multiple and non-trivial selections that underlie
these various representation technologies may influence in various
ways the deliberation or consultation process, possibly undermining
their dialectical freedom.113 This new form of intermediation raises,
therefore, new types of agency problems, and with them the obvious
question: "Who will monitor the work of these new techno-political
intermediaries?"
ill See Nicholas Carr, Is Google Making Us Stupid? ATLANTIC MONTHLY (July/Aug. 2008).
Carr notes that "what the Net seems to be doing is chipping away my capacity for
concentration and contemplation. My mind now expects to take in information the way
the Net distributes it: in a swiftly moving stream of particles. Once I was a scuba diver in
the sea of words. Now I zip along the surface like a guy on a Jet Ski." He uses the term
"staccato quality" to describe the way in which the Internet has influenced his (and others)
thinking.
112 Rehg et al., supra note 86, at 222-23.
113 See Rehg et al., supra note 86, at 218-24.
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One possible response to this new agency problem, which draws
on Habermas's deliberative framework, would be to put these various
technological schemes to some form of democratic test; that is, to
make their various choices and selections the subject of an open
deliberative process.1 4 But this solution seems deeply problematic in
a pragmatic sense. First, the cognitive challenges associated with these
secondary, technical questions may be even larger than those
associated with the primary issues. Second, the costs of such
secondary political deliberation may be prohibitive. While engaging
in such "technical" deliberation may be economically feasible in the
case of wide-ranging consultative frameworks such as the United
States' www.regulations.gov, it seems unrealistic to expect such wide-
ranging efforts in more restricted consultation processes (e.g.,
TransLink). Clearly, it would be unrealistic to establish a consultative
process for each technical choice aiming to make the primary
consultation process more accessible.
Another possible solution is re-complexification. Ramsey and
Wilson argue, for example, that the designers of the deliberative
process should "foreground how information resources were
produced," "demonstrate that information resources have multiple
interpretations," "include multiple and conflicting information
resources," and "encourage critical evaluation of information
resources.""15 The problem with this proposal is that while it tackles
the selection-bias problem, it undermines the efficacy of these
technological tools in reducing the cognitive burden generated by
information overload.
A more pragmatic solution is to facilitate and encourage reciprocal
monitoring between various political intermediaries- including the
new type of techno-political mediators. 1" 6 While this proposal does
not reject the ideal of "informed citizenship," it shifts the focus of the
democratic gaze to the level of communication. The goal of our
democratic institutions becomes not the achievement of wide-ranging
informed civic participation, but that of attaining a communicatively
complex political arena, hosting and supporting diverse streams of
114 Id. at 224 ("AI researcher cannot avoid being drawn into critical discussion as a
participant on a par with citizens-users.").
115 Ramsey & Wilson, supra note 83.
116 A similar idea was proposed by Issacharoff and Ortiz in the context of more
conventional political intermediaries, but I see no reason why it should not be extended
also to cover this new form of political intermediation. Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 54.
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thought. Achieving such a diverse discursive environment requires
the creation of a network of competing political intermediaries.
This proposal raises several challenges. First, democratic societies
need to find ways to encourage the emergence of political
intermediaries with the capacity to criticize this new field of techno-
political intermediation. It is not clear to what extent some of the
traditional observers of the political domain (e.g., journalists, political
scientists, legal scholars, NGOs) have the capacity to fulfill this new
task. Second-and this is one of the new challenges of contemporary
administrative law-the law should create the conditions that will
enable external observers to monitor the technical choices underlying
the new web-technologies. In order not to undermine their
"cognitive" efficacy, such technical disclosure can be implemented
through some form of acoustic separation, distinguishing between the
data given to different users. TransLink's On-Line Advisory Panel
constitutes a crude example of such separation.
To enable such reciprocal monitoring, the law will have to change
the rules governing the field of technical intermediation. First, the law
should give political-intermediaries the option to voice their concerns
in earlier stages of developing new technological tools (such as
www.regulations.gov). While it may be unrealistic to expect wide-
ranging consultation on these technical issues, it seems reasonable to
demand the government to initiate proactive consultation with
relevant stakeholders. Second, the law should provide external
intermediaries, from academic scholars to NGOs, with the right to
access the raw data, allowing them to present it in a different format
that can compete with the official version (possibly under government
funding). 117 Third, an important characteristic of contemporary
politics is that many of the techno-political choices that influence the
way political data is presented and disseminated are made by private
players- from Google to Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes,
AccountAbility and others.118 Given the significant impact of these
"private" selections, modern administrative law will have to develop
ways to open up those "private" choices to public scrutiny.
117 For an interesting example which illustrates the value of alternative interpretations of
raw-data, see http://www.scorecard.org, which interprets the data regarding toxic
emissions disclosed in the EPA's Toxics Release Inventory (http://www.epa.gov/tri).
11s Thus, to give one example, the way in which Google ranks and orders politically relevant
data has important consequences for the political process, given its monopoly status in the
search field.
1Vo1. 5:1
Clearly, these questions-the disclosure of hidden technical
choices and the monitoring of technological intermediaries-are
questions that need to be answered by a reconstructed doctrine of
transparency. Whether the classical doctrines of administrative law
can cope with this challenge is a question that will have to be explored
as the use of digital consultation broadens. Ultimately, it would be
naive to expect either law or computer science to offer an optimal
solution to the problem of information overload. Maybe a change in
perspective is needed. Rather than continue the pursuit of the non-
attainable ideal of a fully informed public dialogue, we should opt for
a more modest goal: to continuously increase (even if only
infinitesimally) the discursive sensitivity of our political sphere.119
119 As Bruno Latour notes: "[]f we are all politically-challenged, if there is no direct access
to the general will, if no transparent dome gives any global visibility, if, at best, blind lead
blind, then any small, even infinitesimal innovation in the practical ways to represent an
issue will make a small, that is, huge difference. Not for the fundamentalist, but for the
realists .... Latour, supra note 4, at 31.
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